Lauren
October 31st, 2006
Archive
Archive for October, 2006
Descartes or the Mob
October 17th, 2006
I can relate to Descartes’ quest to overcome his conceptual framework and the subsequent ideas (true and false) that flowed from such a framework.
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole ediface that I had subsequently based upon them.
I can appreciate his attempt to explore and possibly overcome those false ideas that had been handed down to him before he had the ability or the desire to question them. His journey led him to battle skepticism as he cast doubt upon virtually everything. While I have not journeyed quite that far (and am in general resistant to this form of radical skepticism) I am definitely on a similar quest. Following a path blazed by thinkers far more proficient than myself I want to discover, if possible, what is true and what is mere opinion. Those before and after Descartes wanted to find out those things that were really true. So it is with me. I’d like to think that as I discover things that don’t meet the criteria for justifiable belief I will, for the most part, toss them out. I can also admit that there are ideas that are as yet unjustified but that I hope will be at some point in the future.
What is curious to observe is how tightly people hold onto ideas that are not their own. By that I mean they uncritically accept what they have been taught or adopt some way of viewing the world that they have not truly investigated. Some would say this is the very epitome of unjustified belieft. What’s funny is these ideas are thought, despsite all this, to be correct or even true. These ideas are nothing more than preferences or hopeful expectations disguised as truth or justified by popularity. Of course there is nothing wrong with preferences or hopeful expecations, but elevating their status to beyond that is a mistake. Look around, listen and you will see yourself or others in a similar situation. You can decide if you want to be a Descartes or part of the mob. To avoid artificial duality I guess a better question is what percentage of you is the mob and Descartes. I’d like to think that the closer we are to Descartes (in the questioning/seeking sense, not pure skepticism) the better off we can be.
Forgetfulness
October 15th, 2006
Forgetfullness is like a faithful ally and an arch-nemesis. It has the power to drive us forward during times of failure and impede us when we want to succeed. Left to its own devices forgetfulness will creep into every facet of life. At times it is a welcome friend, but at others it is a hostile enemy.
The Ally
During times of failure, personal tragedy or communal catastrophy forgetfulness arrives as the ally. Slowly memories are pushed into the background. Slowly we find that we are able to continue on with life’s challenges. While the memories never fade entirely and can be recalled sometimes at will and sometimes at the most inoportune times we find we are able to focus on the present.
The Nemesis
We all desire to have proper perspectives, balance our times and occupy ourselves with things that give us and those around us true happiness. The nemesis arrives daily seeking to undermine these desires and replace them with a more unintentional and automatic existence. When the nemesis achieves victory we find that the day has been squandered and our desires have slipped away. Without a willful determination to combat the nemesis we will slump back into the mindless procession.
When we have no will forgetfulness arrives as an ally. When the will is strong forgetfulness comes as our enemy. Welcome the ally, but beware the enemy.
Epistemology Studies
October 13th, 2006
I’ve finally decided that I can no longer procrastinate beginning my intended study of epistemology. Although I’ve read bits and pieces, I have not undertaken a more comprehensive coverage of the subject. The idea of how we know what we know is so foundational (for me anyways) that it cannot really be avoided for too long. To this end I’ve decided to start with the texts listed below. The sources are not exhaustive, but, at a minimum, outline the common challenges and defintion of knowedge as well as present a decent defense against the temptation of skepticism.
Introduction to Epistemology – Charles Landesman
Knowledge of the External World – Betrand Russell
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge – Laurence Bonjour
Warrant and Proper Function – Alvin Plantinga
In Defense of Pure Reason, A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification – Laurence Bonjour
For those on a budget the online sources below are excellent. Just ignore the references to graduate and phd courses and sources. This isn’t rocket science.
Epistemology 1 – Paul Newell
Understanding Epistemology – Duncan Pritchard
The Epistemology Page – Keith DeRose
Epistemology Research – Keith Korcz
Philosophy Resources on the Internet
Thought of the Day
October 13th, 2006
The Truth of History
October 10th, 2006
My dingy, banged-up cardboard box arrived today from Amazon. After a couple of months sitting at the top of my wishlist I decided to take the plunge and purchase C. Behan McCullagh’s examination and defense of the objectivity of history. I’ve only skimmed the table of contents (for the 10th time) and read through a few pages of the introduction, but it looks promising. Here are a few quotes to give you an idea of why I’m looking forward to this read. Of course, it could be that I’m fascinated by the “knowledge problem” manifested in various forms across many disciplines.
“..the facts of cultural relativism and of the relation between language and reality require historians to give up any naive assumption that historical descriptions correspond exactly to the events which they describe in the past.”
It seems as though McCullagh understands the challenges of describing the past in ways that are reflective of the reality at the time.
“Nevertheless there is a sense, which I shall define, in which historical descriptions can be true of the past, allowing that they are always couched in the concepts of a particular culture.”
Again, he understands that both the writer and the historian are selective and constrained to varying degrees by their particular culture, ways of thinking and previous experiences. Coming to the table with this acknowledge goes a long way towards uncovering, as much as we are able, the truth about the past.
“It is normal for there to be more than one true characterization of an event or historical period. The variety of historical interpretations does not exclude the possibility of their truth.”
Behan is quickly responding to those the would claim that the plurality of interpretations is an indication that we cannot recover anything truthful from this enterprise.
Ethics Quiz
October 10th, 2006
Here are the results of the ethics quiz I took. I figured I’d be more Platonic, but I’m intrigued that John Stuart Mill was in the top five. I have an idea of which question resulted in this. It most likely has to do with my distinction between objective moral values and absolute moral values. Yes, there is a distinction. (HT: Patrik)
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1. | Plato   (100%)  Click here for info |
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2. | Aquinas   (98%)  Click here for info |
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3. | Jeremy Bentham   (89%)  Click here for info |
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4. | John Stuart Mill   (89%)  Click here for info |
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5. | St. Augustine   (88%)  Click here for info |
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6. | Epicureans   (79%)  Click here for info |
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7. | Aristotle   (78%)  Click here for info |
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8. | Ayn Rand   (72%)  Click here for info |
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9. | Spinoza   (57%)  Click here for info |
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10. | Cynics   (55%)  Click here for info |
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11. | Thomas Hobbes   (48%)  Click here for info |
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12. | Jean-Paul Sartre   (45%)  Click here for info |
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13. | Kant   (36%)  Click here for info |
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14. | Ockham   (36%)  Click here for info |
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15. | Nel Noddings   (35%)  Click here for info |
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16. | Stoics   (29%)  Click here for info |
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17. | Prescriptivism   (27%)  Click here for info |
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18. | Nietzsche   (22%)  Click here for info |
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19. | David Hume   (21%)  Click here for info |
Ten Propositions on Peace and War – A Short Reponse
October 9th, 2006
I didn’t want to respond point by point to Kim’s “propositions” on peace and war, but it seems I will have to. Of the ten propositions only three offer any compelling explanatory power. The rest are either expansions of the three or “mere opinion”. Rather than make this post way too long, I’ll just offer my responses. For the initial propositions you’ll have to follow the link above.
1. It does not follow that if God is the god of peace then he is a pacifist. Peace and pacifism are not the same, but even in Kim’s title Peace is put in place of pacifism. Equating these two terms is a stretching beyond the bounds of what they mean. Additionally, it does not follow that God wants “pacifism” or “non-violence” between himself and humanity. He wants peace between himself and humanity. How Kim manages to extract “non-violence” from the wider term and meaning of peace is beyond me. Of course, this wouldn’t be the first time I’ve missed something.
2. I’ve already spoken in the comments of the original post about this, but this is, again, a stretch beyond what the texts themselves aim to deliver. We do not have a complete view (even if we use all available Jesus texts) of the life that Jesus practiced. We can at best make inferences, but even these inferences must be made within the continuum of 1st century Judaisms. In this proposition Kim would have us believe we have enough information to inform us about Jesus’ preaching and practice. I’m sorry, but I don’t think we make make these claims in the certain way in which Kim offers them.
3. When we a priori presume as Kim has done in proposition 1 and 2 that Jesus practices of pacifism (point 2) were an embodiment of the divine nature (point 1) then there must be a harmonization of the texts where violence is mentioned. In such a short reponse all I can offer is that the interpretation presented by Kim are in no way agreed upon by all and still hotly debated depending on which a priori assumption you come to the table with. We must resist interpretation of the Christian scriptures using our a priori assumptions.
4. Kim whispers the voices of supersessionism to reduce the effectiveness of the arguments offered by Torah. As I’ve stated elsewhere there is no evidence whatsoever that the earliest followers of Jesus (Jews) discontinued or abandoned strict observance of the Torah.
5. I agree with Kim that the people of God misunderstood, misapplied or refused to apply the commands contained in the Sermon on the Mount. Again, Kim intends his particular interpretation of these texts to be the “most correct” understanding and therefore applied to his ethic of pacifism. Whether his interpretation is in fact the “most correct” I leave to the reader. Again, see point three above.
6. An argument using the “failure” of Just War Theory. Sure we get it wrong, but what does this have to do with a theological view of pacifism (or Peace if you prefer)?
7. Again more anecdotal information regarding contemporary failures. I feel the frustration and agree that we get it wrong, but, again, what does this have to do with the theological view of pacifism (again, Peace if you prefer)?
8. and 9. I’m surprised to see Kim reach back to the “roots” argument. How do we know, unless we assume Kim’s position, that these roots got it right and that their view represent an ideal? A reaching back into time argument doesn’t really work here I’m afraid. We have to demonstrate why they believed what they did, not simply that they believed certain things. This arguments fails to explain.
10. Kim wants us to, as a community, “try pacifisim”, but why should we try something if it is not an ideal we ought aspire to? Kim thinks he has established this in the above propositions, but falls short in my opinion. Kim goes so far to equate loving our enemies with the very concept of pacifism bypassing other ideals such as justice, fairness and mercy.
As should be clear by now, Kim fails to convince me that pacifism is both an ideal communicated in the Christian scriptures and a prescriptive virtue to be practiced above others. Anytime I see a binary (this OR that) approach it warns me to be cautious. To misquote Meier, ” “Indeed the usefulness of the historical Jesus to theology is that he ultimately eludes all our neat theological [or idealogical] programs.” Until we think carefully and clearly about the myriad issues involved we will fall back into these binary distinctions. No matter how strongly we may feel about certain issues using religion or “Jesus Ethics” to promote one particular view just doesn’t work. Well, it can “work”, but you won’t have any succifient justification.
Now, my rant. It is easy to say we must begin the quest to free ourselves from the ravages of war. It is easy to say that pacifism is the only real, noble, virtuous answer to the world’s troubles. However, it is difficult to do when we witness the atrocities committed ALL over the world against those that cannot help themselves or do not have the ability to defend themselves. What is the world, filled with those that want to rid the world of war and pursue peace, going to say when thousands are being slaughtered when they say these easy words? What are they going to do? We can’t start with a clean slate, where all countries and cultures will forgive one another for the crimes perpetrated against them at some time in the recent or distant past. We can move toward a condition where war may not be required, but right now people are dying and saying things does not protect those lives. Should we pursue non-violent means of resolution? Certainly, but everyone in the world does not share a common ethic. In short, this issue isn’t as neat and tidy as some would like you to believe. It requires care, compassion and balance. Beware the binary solutions.
Thought of the Day
October 8th, 2006
I finished Part One of A Marginal Jew which attempts to sketch the problem of reconstructing (or constructing if you’re new) the historical Jesus. Meier discusses categories, sources and criteria and concludes the section with a chapter titled “Why Bother?” where he addresses the theological motivations of such an exercise. I’ll leave anyone interested with a few excellent quotes. They address the benefit of such endeavors. The primary benefit being, in my opinion, a much needed corrective to the ideas, presumptions and creations offered by good-intentioned theologians. While perhaps not all wrong, they had their own challenges (culture, language, biases) that should cause us to critically evaluate some the conclusions these men arrived at.
Like good sociology, the historical Jesus subverts not just some ideologies, but all idealogies.. (p.199)
Indeed the usefulness of the historical Jsus to theology is that he ultimately eludes all our neat theological programs; he brings all of them into question by refusing to fit into the boxes we create for him. (p.199)
Properly understood, the historical Jesus is a bulwark against the reduction of Christian faith in general and christology in particular to “relevant” ideology of any stripe. His [Jesus] refusal to be held fast by any given school of thought is what drives theologians onward into new paths; hence the historical Jsus remains a constant stimulus to theological renewal. (p.200)
Knowledge and Truth
October 8th, 2006
I’ve recently been made painfully aware (yet again) that there is a significant difference between knowledge and truth. Yes, I know, huge epiphany right? The problem most likely stems from the fact that in our culture we use these two terms interchangeably. It isn’t difficult to understand why because they are so closely related. Of course there are several competing defintions of truth, but for a majority of ages it has been viewed as that which corresponds to the way things really are. Knowledge, on the otherhand, is typically the process of justifying our beliefs. More precisely, knowledge is the end result of a process whereby certain conditions must be satisfied to move information from the category of opinion or unjustified beliefs and into the category of knowledge. Knowledge (in its final form or its unjustified form) is whether I believe something to be the case and truth is one of the metrics that determines if what I possess is knowledge or some sort of crazy opinion.
Now, the real fun begins. This is where the entire skepticism, rationalism and epiricism debates get off the ground. We have to determine a) what constitutes truth about the world and b) what the definitive, “absolute” criteria for knowledge is. Many readers (are there many out there?) may wonder why I bother with these distinctions and questions when most would consider these sorts of activities intuitive or obvious. I bother because it is these distinctions or the blurring of them that leads to many situations where individuals presume and act as if they have a type of knowledge that is certain, but in case of point they either have propositional knowledge or, even worse, mere opinion (unjustified belief).
I would agree that through my senses many things about which I have knowledge don’t require this rigorous type of reflection. The challenge, one that I intend to at worst understand completely and at best overcome, is that we all too often place far too many objects into the effortless category. This isn’t to mean, as I’ve said before, that we can’t know anyhing. We have to realize, however, that the nature of a significant portion of our knowledge is propositional. No, I’m not aiming for some positivist certitude here. We can have confidence that our beliefs are true when they pass certain tests (logical, empirical), but we have to remember that it does not give us certain knowledge. We may be right, but we do not know for sure (healthy skepiticism). This realization gives us a bit more humility in our assertions. We should be confident, but not the same type we would have as if we possessed *certainty. Many will ask what the difference is. Sure, we would use the propositional and the certain type of knowledge in the same manner, but shouldn’t there be some distinctions in our presentations and discussions of these types of knowledge? The issue, for me, is that we all too often walk around and present knowledge as the certain kind when in fact we carry something far different. It is why, I think, the label JTB (Justified True Belief) is an appropriate one.
I know there are all sorts of questions about where this leaves matters metaphysical in nature or where this leaves religious faith. I’ve implicitly sketched this outline within the context of this present and past reality (sciences, history, sociology) and have left the questions of faith and other matters to the reader to consider. I imagine I’ll write about the impact of knowledge and truth (epistemology) on these sort of “facts”, but that will have to wait until later. I want to make it clear, that this doesn’t mean we can only know things we can test with our senses (that sort of criteria has its own sort of problems). There are many type of knowledge (how to make something, people I know) that don’t fall within my brief outline. As you can see from only a few sentences of the epilogue that the knowledge problem is foundational and yet we presume so about it much everyday. Is it possible to continue living in ignorance? Sure, civilizations have done it since the dawn of time. In Plato’s words through Socrates “The unexamined life is not worth living”. It isn’t just about truth, but about how we can use that truth to live life better (or how we ought to).