Epistemological Relativism

I have investigated, pondered and even recorded my thoughts on the meaning of faith. While I still have a great deal more to say, especially since I’ve said hardly anything, I think Emil Brunner captures best some of my current feelings on the subject. It is quite amusing or perhaps ironic that I purchased his book a month or two ago and tossed it aside because it seemingly didn’t address the issue and now it somehow manages to address my present situation.

Orthodox theologians never seem to notice that they were using the same word to describe two completely different ideas of “faith”; namely the personal act: the obedience of the trusting soul; the impersonal attitude to something abstract: a priori doctrinal conviction. But it is precisely the non-Biblical idea of faith which predominates in the popular mind. The average Protestant’s idea of faith is thoroughly “Catholic”; it is the one which is represented in the Epistle of James. In these few bare words we have indicated the greatest tragedy in Church history. This alteration in the understanding of faith, which turned the relation of trust in, and obedience to, the Lord of the Church into the authoritarian doctrinal belief in the Bible, is the ultimate reason for the perversion and weakness in Christianity and the Church, from the second century down to the present day.

- Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (The Westminster Press, 1946) 39.

If faith is anything less than real trust (not the blind, wishful thinking type and nevermind for the moment how we arrive at that moment of trust) it becomes a leap into a chasm. Sadly, it is this leap that is conjured up in the minds of people when we use the word faith. I know, we still have lots of work to do, but I think this is a good start.

You may have noticed or will soon be noticing a large flood (if I have the time and inclination) of theological reflections. This is because of my investigations into the nature of faith. I am reading all sort of monographs on the topic. Some authors speak to those that are on the “inside ” (sorry Keith and Dustin) and others who speak to everyone else. This is directly related to my other research in epistemology. It seems at first that faith is somewhat at odds with any sort of epistemological project, but it is too soon to tell. I have already taken some fairly informal polls and sent out a few initial email correspondences with some academics. Unfortunately, it seems that not many people think too much about faith. Is faith some type of reasoning process? Is it concerned with rationality at all? How has the definition of faith been revised since and before the enlightenment? Since this definition of faith is so central it exposes me to a lot of great theological reflection that in my younger fundamentalist days I was sheltered from. Hope you enjoy it.

The God of the Gospel is the God who mercifully dedicates and delivers himself to the life of all men–including their theologies. Nevertheless, he transcends not only the undertakings of all other men but also the enterprise of evangelical theologians. He is the God who again and again discloses himself anew and must be discovered anew, the God over whom theology neither has nor receives sovereignty.

– Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology (Wm. B. Eerdmans 1963) 6.

I know, it is offensive to some to offer commentary on the great Barth, but I can’t resist for that very reason. Really though, if more people (by people I mean, well, you know) read Barth I think the world would be a happier place. Seriously. Many groups give their theologies (which in some ways are convenient constructions even if they are derived from some sacred source) a position of authority on and about God without considering the fact that the very God that they put their faith in transcends the human understanding. Sure we can come up with language and labels that attempt, as accurately as possible, to capture the nature of the object which we label “God” but to presume that we have some comprehensive understanding is quite naive. Yet, this happens all the time.

Yes, I am still reading The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. I’ve been trying to distill what I’ve read into something that may be of some interest to the few readers that I have. I’ll make these bitesize so you have time to sleep in between posts.

Bonjour precisely summarizes the conclusion of the previous chapter by stating that

“…an epistemological account of empirical knowledge must solve two basic and correlative problems: first, that of providing a general account of the standards or criteria of epistemic justification that pertain to such knowledge; and second, that of providing a metajustification or vindication of that account by show that adhering to those standards is likely, in the long run at least, to lead to truth.”

This is an expansion of the third proposition in my previous post. One can honestly believe something, it could be true, but the believer must also have some justification for holding that belief. Although the quote is concise I think what Bonjour is trying to say is that justification should have some sort of criteria to keep it consistent and that this criteria itself must also have a justification. In other words, why is this criteria better than others? In Bonjour’s view the only plausible sort of meta-justification of the criteria is whether it is likely to be truth conducive. I think this works because it avoids a potential regress of justification.

In chapter two Bonjour presents foundationalism as one answer to this justification/criteria/meta-justification problem. However, in this chapter Bonjour is setting the stage for his critique of this classic answer. He summarizes the key tennets of foundationalism which state

(a) that some empirical beliefs possess a measure of epistemic justification which is somehow immediate or intrinsic to them, at least in the sense of not being dependent, inferentially or otherwise, on the epistemic justification of other empirical beliefs
(b) that it is these “basic beliefs” … which are the ultimate source of justification for all empirical knowledge

Before spending too much time on foundationalism Bonjour discusses an age old problem of justification. The regress problem or argument is an artifact of the justificatory requirement. If all beliefs must be justified in the same way, we spiral forever in this process of justification. For example, if I have belief A that is justified by belief B, this belief B must also be justified. Belief B is subsequently justified by belief C, but then what do we do with belief C? Is it justified?

“Thus empirical knowledge is threatened with an inifinite and apparently vicious regress of epistemic justification.”

When we consider this requirement of justification and the available answers to this requirement we are left in quite a conundrum. In fact Bonjour states,

“The stand which a philosopher takes here will decisively shape the whole structure of his epistemological account.”

Indeed. In reading this and the next chapter it is clear that there isn’t a definitive answer to the challenge of justification. Bonjour’s statement early on is important to remember here. We can measure the success of these endeavors by how much they may lead to the truth. Even if methods have a certain appeal or elegance they must, in the end, deliver the goods we’re after.

I have intended for the past week or so to write on faith. In fact, I have several drafts sitting in wordpress. Why the focus on faith? Perhaps because there is no term more overused and yet thoroughly confused than this. I’m sure there are others, but this one is particularly so because it sits on the fence between philosophy and theology. It isn’t a word to be defined purely within the closed system of theology and, at the same time, cannot be adequately described by philosophical reflection. It sits on this fence because it is the means by which some sort of epistemological justification is conferred upon a belief. The real confusion occurs when one examines whether faith is a hopeful leap into the void or some sort of trust based on relational and evidential reasoning. In the former case it may be clear to some that this is not too different that unjustified belief. This is what I’ve typically referred to as mere opinion. A hopeful leap implies that there is no adequate justification for belief. As we all remember, this justification is part and parcel of how we measure whether the beliefs in our minds should be considered knowledge. The latter case is equally confusing because we seem to be using the word faith in place of justified belief. Upon closer examination, however, some may realize that this faith/justified belief doesn’t quite behave the same. There are some question begging scenarios and circularities that surface. Of course, it is no help that many philosopher/theologian types dodge the issue completely or speak so abstractly as to be meaningless. And before too many of you get crazy about this process of defining a “religious construction”, keep in mind that we do this quite often with to describe other cognitive activities which are not specifically religious. So, there is the problem and the reason for the long delay. Hopefully these ideas and arguments will coelesce sometime soon and result in a more refined and precise post.

Don’t you just love those silly little quizes? Yes? Well I found another while perusing my RSS feeds. Apparently I know the Bible 100%. Isn’t that great? Care to try? I won’t mention how terrible some people do on this. Oh wait, too late.

HT: Codex