The Structure of Empirical Knowledge – Chapter Two
Yes, I am still reading The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. I’ve been trying to distill what I’ve read into something that may be of some interest to the few readers that I have. I’ll make these bitesize so you have time to sleep in between posts.
Bonjour precisely summarizes the conclusion of the previous chapter by stating that
“…an epistemological account of empirical knowledge must solve two basic and correlative problems: first, that of providing a general account of the standards or criteria of epistemic justification that pertain to such knowledge; and second, that of providing a metajustification or vindication of that account by show that adhering to those standards is likely, in the long run at least, to lead to truth.”
This is an expansion of the third proposition in my previous post. One can honestly believe something, it could be true, but the believer must also have some justification for holding that belief. Although the quote is concise I think what Bonjour is trying to say is that justification should have some sort of criteria to keep it consistent and that this criteria itself must also have a justification. In other words, why is this criteria better than others? In Bonjour’s view the only plausible sort of meta-justification of the criteria is whether it is likely to be truth conducive. I think this works because it avoids a potential regress of justification.
In chapter two Bonjour presents foundationalism as one answer to this justification/criteria/meta-justification problem. However, in this chapter Bonjour is setting the stage for his critique of this classic answer. He summarizes the key tennets of foundationalism which state
(a) that some empirical beliefs possess a measure of epistemic justification which is somehow immediate or intrinsic to them, at least in the sense of not being dependent, inferentially or otherwise, on the epistemic justification of other empirical beliefs
(b) that it is these “basic beliefs” … which are the ultimate source of justification for all empirical knowledge
Before spending too much time on foundationalism Bonjour discusses an age old problem of justification. The regress problem or argument is an artifact of the justificatory requirement. If all beliefs must be justified in the same way, we spiral forever in this process of justification. For example, if I have belief A that is justified by belief B, this belief B must also be justified. Belief B is subsequently justified by belief C, but then what do we do with belief C? Is it justified?
“Thus empirical knowledge is threatened with an inifinite and apparently vicious regress of epistemic justification.”
When we consider this requirement of justification and the available answers to this requirement we are left in quite a conundrum. In fact Bonjour states,
“The stand which a philosopher takes here will decisively shape the whole structure of his epistemological account.”
Indeed. In reading this and the next chapter it is clear that there isn’t a definitive answer to the challenge of justification. Bonjour’s statement early on is important to remember here. We can measure the success of these endeavors by how much they may lead to the truth. Even if methods have a certain appeal or elegance they must, in the end, deliver the goods we’re after.