Epistemological Relativism

So, I’m reading Without Roots, by Pera and Ratzinger and stumbled across a sentence I cannot help but respond to.

…dialogue cannot be an instrument for the discovery of truth, because Revelation plays that role. In other words, in Christianity truth is not a process, but a state, not a becoming but a being.

– Marcello Pera, Without Roots, p.28

Having never read anything by Pera in the past, I don’t have any real reference point to infer what he may be getting at. Reading this sentence as it stands however, I have to take issue. Even if we grant that Revelation is a valid source of knowledge, it does not follow that we, without the aid of our reason, can understand unequivocally, through whatever medium this revelatory knowledge is delivered, these truths. In other words, there will always be a human mind receiving data. If this is so, then we have all of the baggage that goes along with the human receiver. Time, place, language, culture, religion, all of this will undoubtedly influence the receiver’s interpretation of data. To presume that we are a blank slate capable of receiving data, delivered in most cases within a historical context, exactly as a divine authority intended it is quite amusing. From what I’ve read so far, I don’t think Pera intends this, but I can’t be sure. This objective truth that Pera refers to may be a state, but human minds still have to go through a process of apprehension. This process, as history has no doubt proven, is always a challenge to get right. Furthermore, how do we know when we have received the *truth* and not falsehood? Which measurements do we use? Here, we fall back again upon time, place, language and culture. We judge this truth based on our current criteria for truth. So, if Revelation is a valid source of knowledge, we have to answer in a very real way how we gain access to that knowledge when it is encased in anthropological dressing.

General, Philosophy, Theology Joseph Ratzinger, Marcello Pera

I had a very interesting discussion with my carpool buddy about those atheism versus theism debates that are all the rage these days. He had some very astute observations despite his self-proclaimed lack of knowledge (he’s agnostic and I’m kidding). He noticed how the various camps typically claim that their side was the victor. See, debates aren’t exactly like the UFC. There isn’t a tap-out, a referee stoppage or a decision in the end. Instead, it is just a bunch of fans cheering for their fighter. What’s worse is that it is unlikely that one side would switch to the other as a result of such a brawl, but it is still entertaining and a great fuel source for conversation.

We discussed how atheistic arguments are sometimes made up of refutations of theistic arguments. Now, there is nothing wrong with this. If you can demonstrate that premises are incorrect or invalid you have successfully torpedoed the conclusion. What we observed is that in some cases this method (the refutation of theistic arguments) is successful. If they are successful (I think they are in some cases) then the argument for god is refuted. I agree with this. However, and I know this is obvious here, by refuting a positive proposition we have in no way confirmed it’s negative. In other words, refuting an argument for the existence of god does not get us to the truth claim that there is no god. I know, “the burden of proof is on you to prove god”. I agree. But if I cannot conjure up proof or my proofs are refuted, we simply slide into agnosticism. I can’t jump over the chasm into atheism without some logical help (I need some arguments). At the heart of it atheistic propositions, just like their theistic counterparts, are knowledge claims.

This of course led to all sorts of discussions regarding the problem of knowledge (a favorite of mine). Rarely, if ever, do I get the opportunity to talk about something that I think is fun and yet painful. So, I was sort of like the abominable snow man in this Looney Toons spoof. We talked about deduction and induction and the challenges of a priori knowledge. We talked about what meta-justification is. We even ventured off into the notions of “proof”. It seems that many today view scientific knowledge and proof in  the same way and forget that even within science there are a priori assumptions at play; nevermind the fun that ensues when we talk about sense data and what that data represents. Needless to say debates are a great way to pass the time of a long commute!

Philosophy, Theology, Thoughts

Over the past couple of years I’ve documented my thoughts (in unpublished form) about the ultimate aim of education. Topics regarding virtue, utility, benefits to the state and socialization can be found all throughout my meandering thoughts. I stumbled across an excellent summary and thought I’d share.

For a true education aims at the formation of the human person in the pursuit of his ultimate end and of the good of the societies of which, as man, he is a member, and in whose obligations, as an adult, he will share.

- Pope Paul VI, Gravissimum Educationis (Declaration on Christian Education) October 28, 1965

In this short summary a proper balance between divine purposes and human existence is articulated. Education is more than being trained in a particular craft. It is also more than knowledge of things. It is a complete integration of techne, arete, episteme and other elements. Too much of one and not enough of the other leaves man underdeveloped and ill-equipped to participate in all facets of human existence in the 21st century. What do you think?

Homeschool, Philosophy

The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual belief of his age or his nation, and from the convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. 

  - Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University Press) Chapter 15

Books, Philosophy

The man who cannot believe his senses, and the man who cannot believe anything else, are both insane, but their insanity is proved not by any error in their argument, but by the manifest mistake of their whole lives. They have both locked themselves up in two boxes, painted inside with the sun and stars; they are both unable to get out, the one into the health and happiness of heaven, the other even into the health and happiness of the earth.

– G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Doubleday, 2001) 22.

Philosophy, Thoughts

I was writing a bit off-blog about how different people approach the Protestant Bible. I thought it was interesting so I brought it into the blog to share. For a bit of context, I was speaking with a friend where I was mostly listening to him explain why his informed views of the meaning of the biblical text are to be preferred. Of course, like many people, his explanation was nothing more than an appeal to, “It is so clear, how can you *not* see it my way”. What he did not understand and, at first, acknowledge was the critical role that assumptions play in this process of understanding. Some people call them assumptions, others call them axioms and still others call them facts. The truth of the matter is that these assumptions, the lense by which we view the biblical text, are not themselves built into the text. They are part of our overall approach to reading texts like this. The challenge is that not everyone has the same set of lenses and yet many feel there particular brand of spectacles are the only ones authorized for this use.

These lenses control and in some ways determine how we understand biblical texts. This can be good and bad. If our lenses do not include the consideration of the cultural and historical context of the text things can get dicey. These considerations should constrain the possible meanings. Yes, you heard it right, we may receive the text in a particular way, but that is something entirely different than what the author intended and the first recipients may have understood . Many presume that our twentieth century lenses our the ultimate instrument to see the real meaning of a text. Unfortunately, this includes many, many people. We have to ask though, whether it is appropriate to view a text in a way that is disconnected from its temporal-spatial origin.

It sounds like I’m placing ancient texts in a vault and giving the key to a select few. Perhaps, this is the result and maybe that isn’t a terrible thing. In fact, in evangelical circles, this is the de facto standard anyways. Actually, this is the reason why I am blogging about this to begin with. Many people listen to those in authority who, with mostly good intentions, communicate the meaning of texts without communicating the method and built-in assumptions. I think the quote below from Frank Beckwith, a recent convert to Catholicism, summarizes the dilemma that most simply ignore.

In fact, it was just such reasoning that pushed me toward Catholicism. I thought to myself that if sola scriptura can result in everything from the philosophical theology of Calvinism to the Open View of God, from Nicean Trinitarianism to social trinitarianism to Oneness Pentecostalism’s rehabilitation of Sabellianism to 19^th-century Unitarianism, then sola scriptura is not a sufficient bulwark for sustaining Christian orthodoxy.

Philosophy, Theology, Thoughts

Theological knowledge is no different than your everyday propositional knowledge. By this I mean it is no more certain. I know, this may sound shocking, but try to stay with me. It is not because somebody’s god made a mistake or two. This is not because there are flaws within a particular theistic framework. If anything there is a certain, ummm, certainty about this framework. Direct and unmediated revelatory information from the divine (if you believe in that sort of thing or even temporarily agree for the sake of argument) is hard to dispute. However, this isn’t what we’re talking about.

Most of the time we’re talking about some intermediate delivery system. I say intermediate precisely because the Christian bible, to use a relevant example although any holy book will do, was communicated, written and compiled by human authors. Sure, there are some examples of a direct divine communique to a faithful servant (the Ten Commandments are a good example), but most passages do not follow this pattern. Keep in mind that there are wide disagreements on just what sort of “divine influence” affected the original autographs (if there were such things, but let’s not chase that one for now). Even if we allow for any of these, there still remains a rather acute problem. The problem is that this information when communicated in this way is indirect.

At first glance this may seem to be a trivial difference. Looking back at my previous post on being objective you may be able to see what the implications are. In order to get at this information it isn’t simply a matter of automagically processing it and out come the results. You have to wade through not only your own time and place circumstances, but also that of the author’s. These texts, if we allow for the sake of argument that they are divine communications using a human intermediary, are fixed in time and place. This is so by the very definition of a human intermediary. They are constrained in their ability to communicate by their language, culture and experiences. This leads to some seemingly troubling results. Some portions of our theological truths when derived from these types of texts are not as certain as we like to think. I say some because, as always, we may happen to get lucky (even though we won’t actually *know* this in the epistemological sense).

People, as part of a religious community, and through faith or a priori beliefs know that their texts are god’s communication to mankind. Even allowing for this, we cannot easily overcome the challenge of the human author. This is a problem because within this type of framework some assume their holy texts are not merely the source of propositional knowledge, but the sure, certain and concrete kind of knowledge. The problem is we have to wade through the twofold human element (author and receiver). But, using this reasoning process to extract the most probable meaning (which I believe can be done using reason), however refined and systematized, unfortunately results in merely propositional knowledge. It must be said, that this is not to mean that it is not “good enough” or close enough. Because, for most endeavors, religious or otherwise, this is the type of knowledge we act upon day in and day out. However, we must realize this isn’t the certain and immutable kind of knowledge and many make that mistake.

There have been attempts that assert that certain holy texts have a simple, literal and plain meaning that is mysteriously not subject to the author/reader problem. But, we must ask where this presumption comes from. Is it a divine transmission sent to a select group? Obviously only some get this transmission and the subsequent simple meanings from the texts. Perhaps god is like the phone company’s service. Some people get the right message, others get parts and others get a completely garbled messaged. In the end, even if, as Barth claims, our knowledge of god is certain, how do we get from that knowledge to theological knowledge that isn’t merely propositional? We can’t. But, this is okay and yet causes a great deal of angst among many people. They want the certain and immutable type. Without question it is comforting and secure, but is it really possible or, better yet, necessary to live within the confines of a religious system?

Obviously this only scratches the surface and is incomplete or completely hopeless in certain parts, but I think it is worth reflecting on this and the implications of such a position.

Philosophy, Theology

It is quite a challenge to objectively assess information. Think about it (objectively) for a moment. What do we mean when we say that we’re being objective? Aren’t we saying, in essence, that we have this hope that our personal experiences and idealogies do not cast a glare upon the incoming information that may prevent an honest assessment and fair conclusions? However much hope we have, our personal experiences and idealogies do manage to creep into this process. Sometimes this is intentional and at other times it happens despite our best efforts. This is so, I believe, because these experiences and idealogies are what constitute or construct our presumptive framework or starting point. We don’t really have nor can we attain the ivory tower Baconian position that allows us to automagically and fairly assess information in a machine-like fashion. This is not to say that we cannot introduce methods that limit or curb the introduction of result-skewing presumptions, but it is by no means the silver bullet.

In the strictest sense can we really be objective? Our very existence is particular and not general. It is defined by experiences. These experiences, private and public, are particular and shape the way we view the world. When we make the being objective claim I think what we are aiming at is one of two things. The first is that we are attempting to suspend our personal way of organizing and processing information based on our personal experiences. The second is that we have some sort of methods that minimize the effects of experience that obscure objectivity. Which one are you?

I know this may sound a bit postmodern, but we all have a particular way of viewing the world. We all have a particular ways of handling and processing information. To presume that we can magically suspend all that we have been through, all that we hope for is sorely misguided. So how do we step outside ourselves when analyzing ideas, concepts and other forms of information? Well, we can’t. This is why being objective is a difficult task. Obviously we can have justifiable reasons for arriving at valid and consistent conclusions. Although it sounds almost impossible we can use reason and evidence to form propositional knowledge. But doubt still remains. This is okay and it is inescapable. Where it really causes problems, as always, is when we run to either pole. We either avoid the possibility of being objective altogether or falsely presume that we are being objective and certain when, in fact, we are neither objective nor certain. Obviously, this does not mean that there is no independent objective reality or that we can’t know it. Far from it. It is simply the case, as always that far too often we delude ourselves into thinking our conclusions are perfectly objective or, on the other side, we give up because there is apparently no hope for objectivity.

Philosophy, Thoughts

Yes, I am still reading The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. I’ve been trying to distill what I’ve read into something that may be of some interest to the few readers that I have. I’ll make these bitesize so you have time to sleep in between posts.

Bonjour precisely summarizes the conclusion of the previous chapter by stating that

“…an epistemological account of empirical knowledge must solve two basic and correlative problems: first, that of providing a general account of the standards or criteria of epistemic justification that pertain to such knowledge; and second, that of providing a metajustification or vindication of that account by show that adhering to those standards is likely, in the long run at least, to lead to truth.”

This is an expansion of the third proposition in my previous post. One can honestly believe something, it could be true, but the believer must also have some justification for holding that belief. Although the quote is concise I think what Bonjour is trying to say is that justification should have some sort of criteria to keep it consistent and that this criteria itself must also have a justification. In other words, why is this criteria better than others? In Bonjour’s view the only plausible sort of meta-justification of the criteria is whether it is likely to be truth conducive. I think this works because it avoids a potential regress of justification.

In chapter two Bonjour presents foundationalism as one answer to this justification/criteria/meta-justification problem. However, in this chapter Bonjour is setting the stage for his critique of this classic answer. He summarizes the key tennets of foundationalism which state

(a) that some empirical beliefs possess a measure of epistemic justification which is somehow immediate or intrinsic to them, at least in the sense of not being dependent, inferentially or otherwise, on the epistemic justification of other empirical beliefs
(b) that it is these “basic beliefs” … which are the ultimate source of justification for all empirical knowledge

Before spending too much time on foundationalism Bonjour discusses an age old problem of justification. The regress problem or argument is an artifact of the justificatory requirement. If all beliefs must be justified in the same way, we spiral forever in this process of justification. For example, if I have belief A that is justified by belief B, this belief B must also be justified. Belief B is subsequently justified by belief C, but then what do we do with belief C? Is it justified?

“Thus empirical knowledge is threatened with an inifinite and apparently vicious regress of epistemic justification.”

When we consider this requirement of justification and the available answers to this requirement we are left in quite a conundrum. In fact Bonjour states,

“The stand which a philosopher takes here will decisively shape the whole structure of his epistemological account.”

Indeed. In reading this and the next chapter it is clear that there isn’t a definitive answer to the challenge of justification. Bonjour’s statement early on is important to remember here. We can measure the success of these endeavors by how much they may lead to the truth. Even if methods have a certain appeal or elegance they must, in the end, deliver the goods we’re after.

Philosophy

I have intended for the past week or so to write on faith. In fact, I have several drafts sitting in wordpress. Why the focus on faith? Perhaps because there is no term more overused and yet thoroughly confused than this. I’m sure there are others, but this one is particularly so because it sits on the fence between philosophy and theology. It isn’t a word to be defined purely within the closed system of theology and, at the same time, cannot be adequately described by philosophical reflection. It sits on this fence because it is the means by which some sort of epistemological justification is conferred upon a belief. The real confusion occurs when one examines whether faith is a hopeful leap into the void or some sort of trust based on relational and evidential reasoning. In the former case it may be clear to some that this is not too different that unjustified belief. This is what I’ve typically referred to as mere opinion. A hopeful leap implies that there is no adequate justification for belief. As we all remember, this justification is part and parcel of how we measure whether the beliefs in our minds should be considered knowledge. The latter case is equally confusing because we seem to be using the word faith in place of justified belief. Upon closer examination, however, some may realize that this faith/justified belief doesn’t quite behave the same. There are some question begging scenarios and circularities that surface. Of course, it is no help that many philosopher/theologian types dodge the issue completely or speak so abstractly as to be meaningless. And before too many of you get crazy about this process of defining a “religious construction”, keep in mind that we do this quite often with to describe other cognitive activities which are not specifically religious. So, there is the problem and the reason for the long delay. Hopefully these ideas and arguments will coelesce sometime soon and result in a more refined and precise post.

Philosophy, Theology